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Globalization as discursive resource legitimating sovereignty: The case of the Canadian Arctic

Mathieu Landriault[1]*

*Corresponding author: Mathieu Landriault, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1N 6N5
E-mail: mland031@uottawa.ca

Abstract: The material aspects and impacts of globalization has often been studied by scholars. The discursive power of globalization has not been scrutinized to the same extent. The following article wants to address this gap by conceptualizing globalization as a discursive resource used by political actors especially states, to justify actions and legitimize policies. The case of the Canadian Arctic is studied to understand how framing and meaning of globalization popularized in governmental statements played a pivotal role in legitimating further sovereignty assertions.

Subjects: International Relations; Foreign Policy; Critical Security

Keywords: globalization; Arctic security; foreign policy; Arctic sovereignty

1. Introduction

Globalization, as a set of economic, cultural and social dynamics and forces spreading across national boundaries, has been the object of great scholarly attention. A central line of questioning had to do with evaluating the significance and role of sovereign states in this new context, characterizing states as quasi-obsolete on the one hand and playing a role "as central as ever" on the other (Cohen, 2001, pp. 76–78).

The following article will not offer a contribution to this debate. Rather, it will look at globalization as a discursive resource used and framed by sovereign states and experts to push specific political objectives. Globalization is a contentious concept, one that has had many interpretations and definitions. This reality makes a discursive analysis even more salient: globalization can be harnessed in many different ways and be used as a catch-all explanation, justifying an extension of state control. As Bartelson (2000) put forward, "while there is no agreement about *what* globalization *is*, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite solid agreement *that* globalization *is*" (p. 180). Additionally, reactions of national governments to this phenomenon vary across space and time. For example, globalization is often presented as an unavoidable and irresistible force, supporting the

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mathieu Landriault is a lecturer in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. He is also an associate researcher at the Center for Interuniversity Research on the International Relations of Canada and Quebec (CIRRICQ). He is researching media and public opinion on Arctic security and sovereignty matters as well as Canadian Foreign Policy. This research was part of a broader project to understand discursive practices on the Arctic region.

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The material aspects and impacts of globalization has often been studied by scholars. The discursive power of globalization has not been scrutinized to the same extent. The following article wants to address this gap by conceptualizing globalization as a discursive resource used by political actors especially states, to justify actions and legitimize policies. The case of the Canadian Arctic is studied to understand how framing and meaning of globalization popularized in governmental statements played a pivotal role in legitimating further sovereignty assertions.

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imperative to adjust state practices to reap the benefits of global flows of goods and services. In other contexts, it is presented as a justification to beef up state control, whether embedded in a nationalist or securitizing rhetoric; the darker side of global mobility (trafficking, terrorism, illegal immigration) being called threats to combat.

This article has for objective to study the discursive use of globalization in relation to Arctic security and sovereignty issues by Canadian decision-makers and Canadian Arctic experts. The Arctic region represents a particularly relevant case study; the region remains relatively untouched by the heightened market integration and increased mobility of goods and people characteristics of globalization. Yet, a persistent narrative describes the region as opening due to global warming in different security assessments about the Arctic. Canada represents an ideal focus since the country "has played a central framing role in terms of conceptualizing the Arctic, and Canada was also the instigator of the main Arctic governing mechanism, the Arctic Council" (Battarbee & Fossum, 2014, p. 12). Additionally, the Arctic occupies a central place within the Canadian nation-building project and is an intrinsic component of the Canadian identity. Therefore, it was the subject of special attention from policy-makers and political elites, as can attest the three major policy papers published by the federal government on a ten-year timespan. In comparison, only one white paper on foreign affairs was made public during this same period.

The remainder of the article will be as follows: first, a review of globalization's conceptual complexity will be undertaken, in order to uncover the many globalization discourses. It will decipher what is and isn't part of globalization according to different discourses. Second, a presentation of the geopolitical context surrounding the Canadian Arctic in the past 20 years will be carried out. Finally, we will present and analyze how globalization was framed in three policy documents published by the Government of Canada from 2000 to 2010.

2. Conceptualizing globalization

Globalization is often considered a "messy concept" (Parks & Roberts, 2006, p. 340), one that is multi-faceted and for which specific contours are difficult to draw. However, there exists a common understanding that this phenomenon has emerged as a result of increased forms and processes of global interconnectedness. Improvements and breakthroughs in transportation as well in communication and information technology can explain this heightened level of global connectivity (Held, 2000, p. 396). In turn, these processes can be broken down into economic, social, cultural and political dynamics. Of these, the economic dimension is probably the most prominent, characterized by trade liberalization, flows of foreign investments and increased influence of multinational corporations on national economies. As such, Mittelman (2002) argues that globalization "constitutes a set of ideas centered on heightened market integration, which in its dominant form, neoliberalism, is embodied in a policy framework of deregulation, liberalization and privatization" (p. 2).

We must however also take into account the social and political aspects of globalization so as to have a thorough understanding of the concept. Heightened global flows can also be observed socially as labor mobility and mobility in general have increased, linking globalization to immigration or welfare policies (Lipsmeyer & Zhu, 2011; Walsh, 2008). Different security assessments of Western states since the early 1990s have concurrently pinpointed a darker side of this mobility, composed of non-state threats as varied as the spread of infectious diseases, human and drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorist groups and illegal immigration.

When expanding the focus to the political effects of globalization, growing transnational ties and the development of sociopolitical networks across national boundaries prove to be additional consequences of increased connectivity (Held, 2000; Keck & Sikkins, 2014; Tarrow, 2001). A similar observation can be drawn for increased cultural linkages of once-distant communities (Parks & Roberts, 2006, p. 340). Hence, social movements, cultural groups and non-governmental organizations are better able to develop coalitions to pursue common objectives or priorities and to express their grievances or culture.

Finally, environmental issues, such as climate change or the flow of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), are deemed to represent the environmental side of globalization, since these problems are global both in cause and in effect (Parks & Roberts, 2006). However, it must be noted that environmental globalization stands apart from other forms of globalization listed above, as its core components emanate from unintended or unconscious repercussions of specific actions. For example, industrial activity in Southeast Asia can produce POPs, and this externality may end up being carried to the Arctic region, with mercury entering the Arctic food chain. Here, nature acts as an uncertain variable in the equation, unlike what can be observed in social or political globalization where human beings are the ultimate motor of action.

When looking at globalization as a discourse, the interest lies in how globalization is defined and which aspects of globalization (economic, social, political, environmental) is highlighted. As such, we are interested in the presuppositions, silences and choices made to construct the global as a discursive resource. Causes and consequences of these different types of global forces are not the primary focus of this study. Rather, the speaker's discursive construction of the perceived impacts of global processes is at the center of the present inquiry. As such, discursive construction undertaken by a national government has for objective to persuade and ultimately to justify specific policies. In the case of globalization, this means categorizing these global processes either as transference or transformation.

As transference, globalization is presented as intensified exchanges between pre-constituted units (States, national communities); it is not framed as a call to change a unit's behavior, policies, identity or nature (Bartelson, 2000, pp. 184–186). Statist discourses can then present globalization as a set of forces that can be tackled and kept in check by the state.

Conceptualized as transformation, globalization is deemed to be a systemic factor altering the core identity and behaviors of states. As Bartelson (2000) argued, this is a discourse describing globalization as an outside-in phenomenon: global processes are outside the reach of any single national government. Governments are therefore compelled to adjust, in turn contributing to strengthen and reproduce these systemic forces. Here, such a globalization discourse held by a national government can have for purpose to justify the incorporation of the state in these global processes. As such, globalization is constructed as an unstoppable force that one can only adapt to.

3. The Canadian Arctic

At this point, the description of how globalization has impacted the Canadian Arctic proves to be imperative in order to better understand whether the discursive construction of the Canadian Artic during the globalization era corresponds to reality. For years now, the Canadian Arctic has remained outside of national and international attention. In Canada, the region was considered peripheral, with governmental presence and effective control being minimal. The Arctic has attracted national coverage on a punctual basis, mainly when sovereignty was challenged or perceived as such. The 1969 transit of American tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage (NWT) represents such an example, much like the highly mediatized 1985 transit of the American icebreaker Polar Sea. However, these episodic national crises were short-lived and Canadians quickly lost interest in their Arctic. Canada and the United States signed an agreement in 1988 icing the dispute; both parties agreed to disagree and settled on a practical non-prejudicial accord (Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, & Poelzer, 2008, pp. 125–126). The thick ice cover also acted as a powerful deterrent for further flows of goods or people through the NWT. Logistical obstacles as well as uncertainty made the NWT an unlikely route for commercial maritime interests even though using the Passage would translate into shortening most routes going through the Panama Canal by thousands of kilometers.

The melting sea ice resulting from global warming did not change this reality. Far from becoming a super seaway, the possibility of encountering floating ice in the NWT still frightens shipping companies, whose logic is rooted on a just-in-time principle (Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011). The Canadian Arctic represents a "growing but still modest market" for cruise ship tourism (Lasserre & Têtu, 2015, pp. 24–25).

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Economic globalization would not cross the NWT. In fact, it may be argued that if economic globalization has impacted the Canadian Arctic, it has been through the commerce of seal products by Inuit hunters in Europe and Asia. The 2009 European Union ban on trade in seal products has had a profound impact on Northern communities and especially Inuit ones taking part in this harvest.

As far as social globalization is concerned, very few intrusions were documented. Teeple listed 14 intrusions in the Canadian Arctic from 1943 to 2010. Out of those 14, 10 involved other nations, mainly of military assets (submarines, vessel, plane, troops); only four of these intrusions were related to non-state threats (terrorism and illegal immigration) (Teeple, 2010, pp. 58–59). The darker side of social globalization clearly did not see Iqaluit as a site worth targeting to enter the country.

However, political and cultural globalization offer a contrasting vision. For instance Inuit living in four different nation-states (Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark through Greenland) decided to band together in the 1970s, "forming a transnational Inuit polity" (Abele & Rodon, 2007, p. 58). The creation of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council) in 1977 and their subsequent activism in regional and international organizations may be considered as the best illustration of increased connectivity across national boundaries. Even with limited access to new information and communications technologies (ICT), this new cooperation has "been effective in bridging borders and linking the region from east to west" rather than leaving it in its traditional and state-centric north-south dynamic (Nicol & Heininen, 2009).

No aspect of globalization has been as impactful on the region as environmental globalization. The region has been described as "experiencing some of the most rapid and severe climate change on earth" (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004). Global warming has for corollary to put the food system of Inuit communities in a vulnerable position (Ford, 2009). Similar dynamics have been at play for decades in regards to transboundary pollutants: Industrial activity taking place thousands of kilometers away from the Canadian Arctic also victimizes populations inhabiting in the region. The presence of fertilizers and insecticides has been detected in the Canadian Arctic, transboundary air flows and water currents making the Arctic region into a depositary of these externalities (Coates et al., 2008, pp. 127–128).

Hence, the Canadian Arctic cannot be thought of as an area immune to globalization. However, the social and economic dimensions of globalization are far from prominent, even though they are embedded in popular security and geopolitical discourses about the region as we will see in the next section.

4. Globalization and climate change

Three documents produced by the Government of Canada between 2000 and 2010 will be analyzed: the 2000 Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy, the 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement – Defence, and the 2010 Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. These three statements have been made at different times and under different governments, the first two being products of a government headed by the Liberal party of Canada, while the two remaining ones have been published by a Conservative government.

These three documents were selected since they share enough similarities, enabling comparative insights. For one, all three were international policy statements, with the 2005 document being part of a broader effort to define Canada's international policy. As such, these documents described international and regional environments while prescribing measures to address the perceived challenges. Being international policy statements, they were targeting both international and domestic audiences. Other state and non-state actors looked at these documents as broad orientations the Government of Canada would be following. Domestically, Canadian stakeholders involved on Arctic issues could understand the direction their government wanted to take on Arctic issues.

The international nature of these documents is pivotal. Other policy documents were published during the time period under study. The 2009 Canada's Northern Strategy is the most relevant example. However, the Northern Strategy paper was issued by the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, making the document a rather domestic product. It was not surprising then to observe that environmental protection and socio-economic development were front and center; the main area of interest of the Ministry was Northern development. Hence, one could have observed change by comparing the 2009 document with the 2000, 2005 or 2010 statements when the nature and intent of these documents prevented any comparative insight.

The 2000 statement articulates a transformative vision of globalization, one that changes the nature of how states behave:

> Globalization exposes all regions to new political, economic, socialand environmental forces, which often diminish regional control overevents – even in the most industrialized countries. These forcesinclude the revolution in information technology (for instance, theemergence of electronic commerce), the transboundary movement ofpersistent organic pollutants, climate change, and the spread ofinfectious diseases, such as tuberculosis or AIDS. The transboundarynature of these forces makes international co-operation imperative. (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2000, p. 4)

Globalization and cooperation are terms that are bound together; transboundary issues call by their very nature for coordination and dialogue. This coordination, rooted in multilateralism, is presented as both constraining (by an alteration of the once-ultimate principle of state sovereignty) and positive, or welcomed. Of course, the Government of Canada has been an active participant in moulding these cooperative dynamics and harnessing the power of non-governmental organization and global civil society. In fact, the signature of the Ottawa landmine treaty in 1998 as well as the push to institute the International Criminal Court are two stellar examples of elevated civil society role and Canadian leadership. At the same time, the challenges brought on by globalization are framed as irresistible forces that can at best be managed. Three of these challenges stand out as not having been coupled with concrete solutions or answers in the 2000 Northern Dimension document: the increase in world demand for Canada's northern resources, climate change with its subsequent opening of the Northwest Passage, and finally, the increase in air traffic over the Canadian Arctic. Here, climate change is illustrative of the point of view cited above, as no mention is enunciated in regards to elaborating on the need for mitigation measures. At best, climate change will require adaptation while actually providing increased mobility and possibly generating positive impacts. Thus, these three fatalities are deemed to possess a rosy side as well:

> These various developments enhance the potential for tourism andnew northern transportation routes, and should create new economicopportunities for the North. (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2000, p. 6)

These challenges being outside of the reach of the Canadian state, emphasis must be put into stressing the positives they can yield, even though these contributions (tourism and transportation) could only apply to one of the three (climate change and the opening of the NWT) while being irrelevant in the case of the two others (world demand and air traffic). Threats to Northern communities are mostly conceived as transboundary and environmental: persistent organic pollutants, climate change and nuclear waste (in Northern Russia).

The 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement presents the reader with a clear change of tone and focus. It is interesting to note that the Arctic was addressed as part of the defense component of this policy review exercise rather than the diplomacy or development component. The shadow of the attacks perpetrated on 11 September 2001 on American soil is palpable. Globalization is deemed to have shown its ugly side and increased connectivity is now synonymous with security threats and insecurity:

there remains no Soviet-type military threat to Canadian territory. These concerns disappeared from view during the 1990s, only to be replaced by new and more complex threats that have proved difficult to address […] An increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways. (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2005, p. 5)

Failed states, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as regional conflicts are all woven into the fabric of what is referred to as the "fluid nature of the international security environment" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2005, p. 5). How would this vision of the global tie in with the Arctic region? The Arctic is part and parcel of the domestic front, and as such, it could be targeted by asymmetrical threats. These menaces are deemed to become "more pressing as activity in the North continues to rise" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2005, p. 17). The 2005 statement classifies environmental protection, organized crime and human and drug trafficking as "long-term security implications" that must be dealt with greater requirement for surveillance and control" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2005, p. 17). These threats are deemed imminent and consequences could be dire in case of inaction, as "adversaries could be tempted to take advantage of new opportunities […] through the North" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2005, p. 17).

Therefore, global warming has now for corollary to ease the mobility of undesirable elements of globalization. This assessment downplays the unchanging obstacles that these actors are still facing the inhospitable environment present for the majority of the year, as well as the remoteness (for smugglers to reach southern Canada) of this Northern environment are not tackled or put into perspective. This plays into what Roussel (2010) has called the "Great North under siege rhetoric"; global warming bringing forth a diverse array of menaces. There is a need to note that these are of a non-state nature, thus contrasting sharply with statist disputes and boundary conflicts that have dominated the Arctic security assessment scene up to this point. Hence, we can detect a shift which consists of inserting the Arctic security discourse into broader security agenda post 9/11.

The transition from a Liberal to a Conservative government in January 2006 did not change this fundamental dynamic. Rather, we can argue that this logic was featured front and center of the new government's approach to the Canadian Arctic. A cursory look at the scenarios addressed by the Canadian Forces in their annual sovereignty exercise named NANOOK supports this idea. Designed as a whole-of-government operation "to assert Canada's sovereignty over its northernmost regions" and to respond to "safety and security issues in the North" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2016; "Objectives"), federal agencies were asked for the most part to tackle non-state problems between 2007 and 2011 (see Table 1). Indeed, except for the anti-submarine warfare scenario in 2009, all scenarios addressed issues closely linked to the negative side of social globalization.

These concerns were also highlighted by vocal academics writing guest editorials in Canadian newspapers. The most vocal of them, Michael Byers, articulated this security assessment in 2006:

Table 1. Scenarios simulated in NANOOK sovereignty operations from 2007 to 2011			
Year	**Nature of NANOOK scenarios**		
2007	Oil spill	Drug smuggling	
2008	Ship in distress – Disease outbreak	Oil spill	
2009	Anti-submarine warfare	Downed drone	Threat to critical infrastructure on land
2010	Petrochemical spill on land		
2011	Air-disaster/search-and-rescue operation		

an oil spill would cause catastrophic damage to fragile Arctic ecosystems; a cruise ship in distress would require an expensive and possibly dangerous rescue mission. An international shipping route along Canada's third coast could also facilitate the entry of drugs, guns, illegal immigrants and perhaps even terrorists, as well as providing an alternative route for illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction or missile components. (Byers, 2006, p. A15)

Moreover, the emergence of these threats is seen as the perfect way to strengthen the cooperative ties with a terrorism-obsessed United States. Here, non-state threats allow states to agree on a common agenda, even on issues where territorial disputes are unresolved. The presence of the Danish Navy and American Navy and Coast Guard to the NANOOK exercises from the onset are indicative of this objective, in addition to serving as a venue to showcase Canadian control over its Arctic.

In many ways, the 2010 Statement on Canada's Foreign Policy mirrors the threats listed in the 2005 international policy statement and conceptualized in the NANOOK operations. As such,

Over time, increased access to the Arctic will bring more traffic and people to the region. While mostly positive, this access may also contribute to an increase in environmental threats, search and rescue incidents, civil emergencies and potential illegal activities. (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2010, p. 2)

These illegal activities are further detailed, all social globalization ills targeted in 2005 (environmental emergencies, organized crime, as well as human and drug trafficking). Hence, on some regard, the 2010 statement represents a continuity rather than a rupture in governmental framing of the Canadian Arctic strategic environment. This observation is not surprising as globalization forces are instrumentalized to fit what is perceived as Canadian interests. A key interest is to assert Canadian sovereignty by way of presence in and control over its Arctic territory. Starting in the 1990s, successive cutbacks made Arctic surveillance and patrols a rare occurrence (Huebert, 2006).

Tackling the non-state threats cited above has for consequence to show willingness in acting against what most would define as public safety issues. Preventing drug trafficking and fighting organized crime are quintessential Westphalian tasks, considered to generally take place within a sovereign state. These routinize control over the area and act as further arguments to state that this portion of the Arctic belongs to Canada, and this, even though territorial disputes are still unresolved (namely the one on the status of the Northwest Passage). As such, globalization is not much framed in terms of transformation (such as it was in the 2000 statement), than it is in terms of transference.

Further, the relative paucity of Canadian vessels, planes and icebreakers that are capable of patrolling the Canadian Arctic when compared to the activity generated by other Arctic countries makes a focus on the necessity of non-state threats. With Canada being unable to compete or confront an Arctic giant like Russia or the United States, inter-state cooperation against the ills of social globalization sounds more appealing. The search-and-rescue agreement negotiated at the Arctic Council is a great example of such desirable cooperation:

One very important initiative is the current effort within the Arctic Council to negotiate a search and rescue agreement for the Arctic. Information sharing, coordination of efforts, and pooling resources are all concrete ways in which partnership may be beneficial. (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2010, p. 9)

Globalized forces are reduced to actors and phenomenon which can be dealt with state power without fundamentally altering a state's identity, policies or nature. In its sovereignty section, the 2010 document put a sustained emphasis on inter-state disputes and diplomatic relations rather than transnational dynamics; this represents the most fundamental difference with the 2000 policy paper.

The global is constructed by the Conservative government as bringing mostly positive changes. This vision has been elaborated in a previous document published by the Government of Canada in 2009 called Canada's Northern Strategy, in which great economic benefits are said to be anticipated, mainly from the natural resources sector:

> From the development of world-class diamond mines and massive oil and gas reserves, to the growth of commercial fisheries, to a thriving tourism industry that attracts visitors from around the globe, the enormous economic potential of the North is being unlocked. (Department of Indian Affairs & Northern Development Canada, 2009, p. 5)

The Canadian state is also presented as an actor pushing forward globalized ties, further strengthening the transference understanding of globalization. Free trade agreements with other Arctic states and other trade agreements that could benefit trade from the Canadian Arctic are mentioned, as well as foreign investments in Canadian Arctic development projects. Again, the region is integrated into a broader narrative, but this time, one that has domestic roots. The Conservative government put a particular emphasis on resource development as a preferred vector of economic growth for the country as a whole (Way, 2011). Canadian Arctic resources were framed as part of this broader discourse, depicting Canada as an "emerging clean energy superpower" while "our Northern energy and natural resources potential" made the country climb to the status of "Arctic power" according to the 2010 statement on Canada's foreign policy (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2010, p. 3).

On the other hand, climate change is described as an "event taking place far outside the region [...] with significant impact on the region's unique and fragile environment" (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2010, p. 15). On this aspect, globalization reassumes its transformation character, being dubbed a "global challenge requiring a global solution" (Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade of Canada, 2010, p. 18). However, this emphasis on the global nature of climate change led the Canadian government to militate for an all-or-nothing solution, leading the country to become an obstacle in the discussion leading to a post-Kyoto reductions agreement (Smith, 2010). As for other dimensions of environmental globalization, the preferred approaches are for them to be dealt with either pollution-control measures or conservation initiatives.

5. Government and media

These three policy documents helped legitimize a practice that was previously implemented by different agencies and departments in annual deployments. The Arctic annual exercises preceded the 2005 policy document; the latter acted however as a way to justify this practice after the fact.

The 2005 and 2010 policy documents also reinforced an idea supported in the media that the Arctic was under siege by virtue of receding ice. The Canadian media was clear in rejecting then Foreign Affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy's position as outlined in the 2000 document. In fact, from 2000 to 2005, a majority of opinion texts published in Canadian newspapers defended the idea of use it or lose it or that Canadian sovereignty was in danger of being lost to foreign powers (Landriault, 2017). Alarmist accounts and vigorous call for action started to decrease after the 2010 policy document, helping to reassure Canadian opinion leaders that Canada was in control. Further, the idea that a constellation of non-state actors was about to take advantage of increased access to the region was widespread in newspapers editorials (Landriault, 2013). The list usually included organized crime, illegal immigration and terrorists as elements likely to invest the Arctic terrain.

On this regard, the media can be seen as a precursor of policy, the 2005 policy document supporting and legitimizing this assessment. As such, these policy documents share similar representations than the media by strengthening state-centred understandings and geopolitical rationales of the Arctic (Nicol, 2014, pp. 20–21), presenting non-state actors as threatening and destabilizing.

This convergence of media, bureaucratic and governmental perspectives on Arctic security led to a stable Canadian Arctic policy, even when a different party is elected in Ottawa. The new 2017 Canada's defence policy document reiterated this point. The same assumptions about increased accessibility arguments are raised, leading to "increased safety and security demands related to search and rescue and natural and man-made disasters to which Canada must be ready to respond" (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2017, p. 51). The imperative then becomes to increase surveillance and to control the flow of non-state actors transiting in the region.

Similar to past Arctic policy documents, state actors were presented in a positive fashion, high-lighting that "Arctic states have long collaborated on economic, environmental and safety issues" in a "productive collaboration" endeavor (Department of National Defence of Canada, 2017, p. 50). In previous documents, the absence of military conflict in the region was emphasized to downplay the risk of inter-state conflicts.

6. The global Canadian Arctic

As we discovered, globalization can be used as discursive resource to justify sovereignty. The choices made and silences operated are telling. For the most part, the Canadian government's discourse on globalization's effects on the Canadian Arctic has focused on the dangers brought forward by social globalization, even though these threats were in reality not the most significant ones for the Arctic region. In fact, when looking at governmental practices through the prism of the NANOOK sovereignty operations, one finds that the majority of simulated scenarios focused on environmental protection, namely oil spill or petrochemical leakage, rather than focusing on preparing to tackle organized crime or illegal trafficking.

Such discrepancy between discourse and practice is interesting; this seems to indicate that these discursive resources are mobilized to legitimize a specific approach or policy to the public. Hence, global security discourses are applied to the Arctic, reflecting the *zeitgeist* of a particular time rather than actual reality. Media representations of the region supported this particular threat assessment of Arctic security.

As the Arctic region is increasingly integrated into global economics, political and social dynamics, the term "global Arctic" has increasingly started to be used by intellectuals, civil society and decision-makers alike. The emergence of new players in the circumpolar region, especially non-Arctic states such as China, the European Union or South Korea, can explain this tendency to now consider the region as a truly globalized one. Thus, it has become even more critical to study how this term is used and what type of meaning is being associated with it, as critical geographer Klaus Dodds (2016) has recently exhorted. Further work is necessary to uncover how globalization can become a powerful discursive resource, one that has the potential to convince people to support specific policies. This imperative requires analyses acknowledging both the complexity and multiple interpretations inherent to the concept of globalization.

Author details
Mathieu Landriault[1]
E-mail: mland031@uottawa.ca
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3357-1980
[1] School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1N 6N5.

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